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The Movement of U.S. Criminal and 
Administrative Law: Processes of Transplanting 
and Translating 
TOBY S. GOLDBACH* 
BENJAMIN BRAKE** 
PETER J. KATZENSTEIN*** 
ABSTRACT 
This article examines the transplanting and translating of law in 
the domains of criminal procedure and administrative law. The 
transnational movement of law is full of unexpected twists and turns 
that belie the notion of the United States as a legal behemoth. 
Furthermore, the movement of legal procedures which occurs both 
within and across countries with common and civil law legal traditions 
challenges preconceived notions of an orderly divide between legal 
families. While the spread of elements of the U.S. jury system and 
methods of plea bargaining reveals the powerful influence of U.S. legal 
ideas, the ways that these procedures undergo processes of translation 
also illustrates the growing prevalence of legal syncretism. The uneven 
record of transplanting and translating principles of U.S. domestic 
administrative law into international organizations exemplifies 
pluralism in the absence of a global legal hegemon. Our aim is to draw 
attention to the interaction between international and domestic legal 
factors and to show that multiple legal products shape processes of 
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transplanting and translating, thus creating a polymorphic legal world 
often characterized by syncretic practices. The new normal is broad 
consultation of a range of international models and a facility for 
translating multiple or even conflicting legal practices. This presents 
opportunities for positive legal change and complicates efforts to locate 
clear sources of power in the movement of law. 
INTRODUCTION 
Law is defined by incessant movement involving state and nonstate 
actors operating in a world that is both international and transnational. 
Legal transplanting and translating are central aspects of that world.1 
We focus here specifically on transplanting and translating criminal and 
administrative legal procedures.2 In the era of the primacy of the United 
                                                                                                     
 
 1. See generally ALAN WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
(1974) (examining historical transplanting of rules); Michele Graziadei, Comparative Law as the Study 
of Transplants and Receptions, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 441 (Mathias Reimann 
& Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006); Gianmaria Ajani, By Chance and Prestige: Legal Transplants in 
Russia and Eastern Europe, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 93 (1995); Louis F. Del Duca & Alain A. Levasseur, 
Impact of Legal Culture and Legal Transplants on the Evolution of the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 1 (2010); Amalia D. Kessler, Limited Liability in Context: Lessons from the French Origins of 
the American Limited Partnership, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 511 (2003); Jonathan B. Wiener, Something 
Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global Environmental Law, 27 
ECOLOGY L. Q. 1295 (2001). 
 2. We have chosen to address a specific part of comparative public law in full 
awareness that we are not dealing with the global movement of constitutional law, which 
is one of the most important areas of public law legal transplants. See generally RAN 
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS & CONSEQUENCES OF THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 11-12 (2004) (arguing that increased powers of judicial review is a 
product of a strategic interplay between threatened political elites, economic elites, and 
judicial elites and national high courts; constitutionalization of rights is “often not a 
reflection of a genuinely progressive revolution in a polity; rather, it is evidence that the 
rhetoric of rights and judicial review has been appropriated by threatened elites to bolster 
their own position in the polity”); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit 
Choudhry ed., 2006); Bruce Ackerman, The New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 
633, 636-40 (2000) (arguing against the export of the U.S. constitutional system and in 
favor of Parliamentarianism and the constitutional systems of Germany, Italy, Japan, 
India, Canada, and South Africa, with the German constitution in particular having 
inspired other countries transitioning from authoritarianism); Jacco Bomhoff, Balancing, 
the Global and the Local: Judicial Balancing As a Problematic Topic in Comparative 
(Constitutional) Law, 31 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 555 (2008); Ran Hirschl, The 
Realist Turn in Comparative Constitutional Politics, 62 POL. RES. Q. 825 (2009) 
(discussing realist and contextualist explanations of constitutional courts and judicial 
review); Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism, and International 
Regimes,16 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 621, 633-36 (2009) (arguing that multiple high 
courts assert jurisdiction over constitutional norms, including specialized constitutional 
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States during the second half of the twentieth century, U.S. influence on 
and involvement in the movement of law has been substantial, yet 
limited.3 Although the United States’ expansive influence is undeniable 
in many domains of law, its influence is neither direct nor simple. 
Transplanting and translating law in the domains of criminal procedure 
and administrative law are marked by unexpected twists and turns that 
belie the notion of a U.S. legal behemoth calling the shots in a system of 
legal imperialism.4 The movement that does occur, both within and 
across countries with civil and common-law legal traditions, challenges 
an orderly divide between legal families.5 
In the area of criminal procedure, elements of the jury system and 
methods of plea bargaining, once defining features of the U.S. legal 
system, have spread far and wide across civil and common-law systems 
and into the far-reaches of a world marked increasingly by legal 
syncretism.6 On the other hand, an uneven record of transplanting and 
                                                                                                     
courts and national courts that incorporate the European Court of Justice’s constitutional 
doctrines). 
 3. See generally Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, Lost in Translation? 
Non-State Actors and the Transnational Movement of Procedural Law, 67 INT’L ORG. 4 
(forthcoming October 2013) (describing the movement of the U.S. class action and 
discovery process; the movement of U.S. law has reshaped legal theory, pedagogy, 
procedure, and the organizing structure of the legal profession, however Americanization 
competes with other forces, including Europeanization, Islamicization, Sinicization, 
Indianization, and Japanization); but see Richard O. Lempert, The Internationalization of 
Lay Decision-Making: Jury Resurgence and Jury Research, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 477, 
478 (2007) (examining that while domestically in the U.S., reforms aimed at reducing the 
jury’s jurisdiction, internationally, the common law jurisdictions, as well as former Soviet 
countries, enacted reforms to establish or reestablish U.S-style jury systems). 
 4. See generally JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND 
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 8-9 (1980) (discussing the unsuccessful attempts to 
transplant and develop U.S. legal frameworks in developing countries, due to a lack of 
understanding “local language, law, polity, economy, or culture”). 
 5. H. Patrick Glenn, Comparative Legal Families and Comparative Legal Traditions, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 421, 422; John Henry 
Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of Civil Law and the Common Law, 17 
STAN. J. INT'L L. 357, 380-382 (1981); see generally MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L'E. LASSER, 
JUDICIAL DELIBERATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL TRANSPARENCY AND 
LEGITIMACY (2004) (arguing that both French civilian and U.S. common law judges apply 
textually formal and pragmatic modes of interpretation; approaches may differ, but judges 
have common concerns around issues of transparency, judicial accountability, and 
democratic debate and deliberation); JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 
(1985) (arguing that there is diversity in civilian systems). But see Ralf Michaels, Two 
Paradigms of Jurisdiction, 27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1003, 1007 (2006) (arguing that U.S. and 
European approaches to jurisdiction are “strikingly different”). 
 6. Legal systems adopt a mix of rules and procedures that hail from multiple sources. 
Jurisdictions, especially in East Asia, have incorporated both common law (jury) and 
civil-law (lay judge) transplants. See, e.g., Ryan Y. Park, The Globalizing Jury Trial: 
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translating principles of domestic administrative law into international 
organizations exemplifies competition in the absence of a global legal 
hegemon.7 This disparity of influence in different domains of law 
emerges in part because global governance models lack clear executive 
or legislative functions of government.8 Even without structural 
                                                                                                     
Lessons and Insights from Korea, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 525, 532-33 (2010) (discussing South 
Korea’s “hybrid institutional design”); see discussion, infra Section II. 
 7. On the decline of the United States as a global hegemon and the effect on the 
international system see generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION 
AND DISCORD IN THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY (1984) (arguing that international 
sectoral regimes persist and affect patterns of cooperation in the absence of U.S. 
hegemony). On the lack of a unified global legal framework see Andreas Fischer-Lescano 
& Gunther Teubner, Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in The 
Fragmentation of Global Law, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 999, 1004, 1008-09 (Michelle Everson 
trans., 2004) (arguing that global legal fragmentation is “the expression of deep 
contradictions between colliding sectors of the global society”; transnational legal regimes 
define their jurisdiction along issue-specific rather than territorial lines). Challenging the 
claim that U.S. law currently has hegemonic status, German public law with its emphasis 
on proportionality serves as an example for public law systems. See, e.g., Susan Rose-
Ackerman, American Administrative Law Under Siege: Is Germany a Model?, 107 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1279 (1994) (comparing U.S. administrative law system, which focuses on 
oversight of executive processes, to German public law system, which focuses on the 
protection of individual rights against the state, in light of U.S. problems of judicial 
activism). Japan adopted the German Commercial Code in modified form, and generally 
the German legal tradition influenced several European and East-Asian countries. See 
Rafael La Porta, Forencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic 
Consequences of Legal Origins, 46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 290 (2008). On the 
movement of administrative law into international organizations, see discussion, infra 
Section III. 
 8. It is axiomatic that the international sphere is not governed by a centralized body 
which performs executive and legislative functions. See generally HEDLEY BULL, THE 
ANARCHICAL SOCIETY: A STUDY OF ORDER IN WORLD POLITICS (1977); KENNETH N. WALTZ, 
THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 93 (1979) (In domestic politics, “Congress makes the 
laws; the executive branch enforces them; agencies administer laws; [and] judges interpret 
them.” In contrast, the international political system contains like units (e.g. states) that 
are not differentiated by the functions they perform: “Anarchy entails relations of 
coordination among a system's units, and that implies their sameness.”). Legal and 
international relations theorists who challenge the realist account of exogenous structure 
formation and state-centric versions of governance include Anne-Marie Slaughter, 
Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International System, in GLOBAL 
PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY 12, 28 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002) (advocating for a 
perspective that “disaggregate[s] the state,” and identifies the components of the 
international system based on “common governance functions rather than reified unites of 
power”); John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism 
and the Social Constructivist Challenge, 52 INT’L ORG. 855, 871, 875 (1998) (arguing that 
constitutive rules are needed to explain the origins of international relations and to rescue 
structure from being treated “as the reified residue left behind by long-ceased historical 
processes”); Alexander Wendt, Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social 
Construction of Power Politics, 46 INT’L ORG. 391, 394-95 (1992) (arguing that “anarchy” 
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impediments, the transnational movement of U.S. administrative law 
confronts competition and co-optation in articulating or controlling the 
legal landscape.9 
The intent of this paper is to offer a nuanced view of the movement 
of law, transplants, and translation. This paper takes inspiration from 
works that question definitive categories,10 look to social processes in 
the movement of law,11 and challenge scholars to be self-reflective about 
their own connections to issues of governance and intellectual 
histories.12 Although some of this is not new, legal transplant literature 
maintains an awkward relationship to issues of governance and 
history.13 Scholarship still unfolds largely “in the shadow of”14 Alan 
Watson,15 telling a story of how local and national culture matter to 
law’s implementation, or of the extent to which legal families play a role 
in the reception of foreign law. Legal transplant scholars tend to 
downplay conflict and competition in the movement of law,16 and remain 
                                                                                                     
in the international system does not exist apart from the practices that create structures 
of identities and interests); Gunther Teubner, Breaking Frames: The Global Interplay of 
Legal and Social System, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 149, 149, 157 (1997) (describing how various 
sectors of world society, including multinational enterprises, labor, human rights, and the 
internet, are “breaking the narrow frame of national law” and developing a global law in 
isolation from the state). 
 9. On competition in the transnational movement of administrative law, see 
discussion, infra Section III(A). 
 10. See, e.g., ANNELISE RILES, COLLATERAL KNOWLEDGE (2011). 
 11. See, e.g., LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Yves 
Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2011). 
 12. See generally David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: 
Comparativism and International Governance, 2 UTAH L. REV. 545, 592-606 (1997) 
(asking to uncover connections that have led to governance through “distance, denial, and 
avoidance”); Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of 
Comparative Law as a Critique of Global Governance, in PRACTICE AND THEORY IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW 186 (Maurice Adams & Jacco Bomhoff eds., 2012) (examining 
comparative law’s meanings and methods of inquiry along with current debates about 
context of comparative and transnational law). 
 13. Kennedy, supra note 12, at 554 (“[C]omparative law … see[s] itself as precisely not 
about politics or governance, as existing rather in the realm of history or thought, as an 
intellectual project of understanding between cultures whose similarities and differences 
are foregrounded.” Matters of intercultural struggles are background.). 
 14. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979). 
 15. See, e.g., William Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): The Logic of Legal 
Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489, 489-92 (1995) (examining and applying Watson’s 
theory); Michele Graziadei, Legal Transplants and the Frontiers of Legal Knowledge, 10 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 723, 726 (2009) (discussing Watson’s publications). 
 16. Legal transplant scholars focus on whether foreign legal systems can incorporate 
transplants and generally fall into two camps: a cultural connection does or does not 
matter. Examples of scholars in the first camp include Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility 
of ‘Legal Transplants,’ 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997), and Maximo Langer, 
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quiet about contestations in cultures that are fluid.17 Our aim is to draw 
attention to the interaction between international and domestic legal 
factors, and to show that multiple legal products impact processes of 
transplanting and translating, creating a polymorphic legal world often 
characterized by syncretic practices. 
Tracking the spread of public law offers unique insights into 
processes of transplanting and translating law and legal procedures. 
Compared to private law, public law is especially connected to state 
policy, security, and organizational choices.18 In other words, it is 
located closer to the “organic” end of the rules spectrum and therefore 
more resistant to being transplanted.19 For reasons of length, this 
article attends only to the domestic aspects of criminal procedure and 
the international features of administrative law. A comprehensive 
treatment of both the domestic and international aspects of 
transplanting and translating these legal domains must be left to 
others. This article’s intent, instead, is to deploy and broaden a 
sociological perspective on the movement of law,20 in order to challenge 
both hegemonic or imperialist legal domination models and cultural or 
                                                                                                     
From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea Bargaining and 
the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (2004). WATSON, 
supra note 1, typifies the second camp. What is missing in both literatures is a detailed 
account of how legal change occursthe details, processes, and minutia of unpacking 
transplants. Dezalay & Garth have been involved in several research projects looking into 
“competitive processes” implicated in the movement of law, in particular in “creating and 
maintaining a demand for transnational norms.” See Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, 
Marketing and Selling Transnational ‘Judges’ and Global ‘Experts’: Building the 
Credibility of (Quasi)Judicial Regulation, 8 SOCIO-ECON. REV. 113, 114-15 (2010); YVES 
DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF PALACE WARS: LAWYERS, 
ECONOMISTS, AND THE CONTEST TO TRANSFORM LATIN AMERICAN STATES (2002); GLOBAL 
PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW LEGAL 
ORTHODOXY, supra note 8; Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Marketing and Legitimating 
Two Sides of Transnational Justice: Possible Trajectories Toward a Unified Transnational 
Field, in LAWYERS AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF TRANSNATIONAL JUSTICE 277 (Yves Dezalay 
& Bryant G. Garth eds., 2012). 
 17. Annelise Riles critiques the legal pluralist approach which “treats cultural 
diversity simply as an increase in the quantity of communities” rather than embracing 
contemporary anthropological understandings that culture is hybrid and fluid: “‘culture’ is 
more of a constant act of translation and re-creation or re-presentation than it is a fixed 
and given thing.” Annelise Riles, Cultural Conflicts, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 273, 285, 
295 (2008). Legal transplant scholars similarly treat diversity in legal transplants as 
manifesting through local cultural resistance to foreign legal norms rather than competing 
and contradicting processes of reception. 
 18. See RILES, supra note 10, at 42, 171 (regarding the lack of neat distinctions 
between private and public law). 
 19. Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 
17 (1974). 
 20. See Brake & Katzenstein, supra note 3. 
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structural legal families’ models. This article develops its conceptual 
language in Part I, and discusses domestic criminal procedure and 
international administrative law, respectively, in Parts II and III. It 
ends with brief sketches of what an analysis of international criminal 
procedure and domestic administrative law might look like and what 
this tells us more generally about contemporary movements of law.   
I.  TRANSPLANTING AND TRANSLATING LAW 
Whether law migrates horizontally across legal systems, 
standardizes legal approaches to common concerns,21 or moves by other 
means, transplanting and translating are part of that process. Both 
transplanting and translating are captured best by an interactional 
perspective on the movement of law. In this view, states, corporations, 
international governmental and non-governmental organizations, and 
individuals interact in various transnational arenas to make, unmake, 
and remake law.22 An interactional perspective stresses the coevolution 
and commingling of local and domestic as well as international and 
transnational legal norms and practices.23  
Harold Koh, Alec Stone Sweet, and Jutta Brunnée and Stephen 
Toope offer different but related formulations of such a perspective. For 
Harold Koh, transnational legal processes break down the sharp 
distinction between domestic and international affairs.24 Laws percolate 
in all directions—upward, downward, and sidewaysand thus connect 
different legal arenas and actors. This movement encounters actors 
capable of self-reflection, thus permitting the emergence and 
                                                                                                     
 
 21. See, e.g., Kim Lane Scheppele, The International Standardization of National 
Security Law, 4 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 437 (2010) (examining how multiple 
countries adopted similar antiterrorism laws after 9/11). 
 22. JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 20-23 (2010); Gregory Shaffer, 
Transnational Legal Process and State Change, 37 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 229, 229-30 
(2012); see Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, The Use of Force: International Law After 
Iraq, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 785, 801-04 (describing the involvement of NGOs and 
international organizations in conversations about the development of humanitarian 
intervention as a legal justification for the use of force in international law); Terence 
Halliday & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Legal Orders (May 2012) (unpublished paper) 
(on file with author) (arguing that industry invention, transformations in national 
economies, or even changes in leadership of international organizations are all factors in 
the transformation of transnational legal orders); see generally TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE (Gregory C. Shaffer ed., 2013).  
 23. See Kennedy, supra note 12, at 554. 
 24. See Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 
(1996). 
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internationalization of new legal norms.25 For Alec Stone Sweet, the 
movement of law in dyadic contracting arrangements evolves into 
triadic dispute resolution mechanisms that, over time, filter back into 
reasoning processes and legal practices.26 Utility-maximizing strategies 
at any one time thus blend over into slowly evolving normative 
arrangements. In this view, law does not need to be internalized to 
become effective. Instead, law is an evolving arrangement that manages 
conflict and enables actors to contract, dispute, argue, and persuade one 
another.27 Finally, Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope focus on 
decentralized communities of legal practice that are grounded not in 
codified norms legislated by states as much as in shared social 
understandings.28 Criteria of legality interior to the law create legal 
obligation and push actors toward adherence of legal norms.29  
Although different in focus, all three accounts emphasize interaction 
in the movement of law and stress how transplanting and translating 
occur through self-interested and normative action that generates legal 
normativity. For Maximo Langer, transplanting and translating are 
useful concepts to specify many of the processes by which legal systems 
interact.30 The influence of U.S. legal practices on other systems, he 
                                                                                                     
 
 25. Id. at 186-91 (discussing “exceptionalism through transnational legal process” and 
referring to exceptionalism as relating to the United States); see Harold Hongju Koh, On 
American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1501-03 (2003) (discussing “the 
evolution of transnational legal processes”). 
 26. See Alec Stone Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 
COMP. POL. STUD. 147, 164 (Apr. 1999).  
 27. Id. at 154-55. 
 28. See BRUNNÉE & TOOPE, supra note 22.  
 29. Id. at 16, 24; Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Constructivism and International 
Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 119 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013); 
Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of 
Law & Politics, 55 INT’L ORG. 743, 749-750 (2001) (adopting Fuller’s criteria for legitimacy, 
and arguing that legitimacy generated through attention to internal legal values, 
including the processes by which law is created and applied, is an essential source of 
obligation). On the internal criteria of legality, see generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977); LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964); ROBERT 
SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER (1984); Lon L. Fuller, Postivism & Fidelity to Law: A Reply to 
Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958). Fuller’s criteria of legalitythat in order for 
something to be law it must be general, proscriptive, publicly accessible, etc.stands in 
contrast to Hart’s legal positivism, where obligation is felt internally but as a result of 
social acceptance of rules for creating rules. On legal positivism, see generally H.L.A. 
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1994); JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1990); 
SCOTT SHAPIRO, LEGALITY (2011); Scott J. Shapiro, What Is the Internal Point of View?, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1157 (2006). 
 30. See Langer, supra note 16, at 29, 31. 
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argues, is not simply a transplant, whereby a transplanted organ 
continues to function as it did in the original body. Instead, translation 
evokes the uncertainty of the outcome and the notion that a law’s actual 
practice depends in part on the receiving country’s legal language and 
the decisions of the legal translator.31 Langer’s case studies include 
recent reforms in civil law systems toward U.S.-style civil and criminal 
procedures; these tend to make the judge a more passive actor by 
strengthening the role of the prosecution and defense in fact finding and 
in conducting the proceedings themselves.32 He concludes that, because 
of the different preexisting structures of meaning in different civil law 
countries (such as Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France) that have 
imported these procedures, the importation of the same procedure has 
affected these states’ legal systems in varying ways.  
A.  Transplanting 
The transplant concept points to the complex requirements for 
recipients and donors for processes of diffusion and reception that 
reflect the mutually constitutive relations between migratory and local 
law.33 Several decades ago, Alan Watson was among the first to write 
about the spread and reception of a law and the fit it required between 
transplanted and local laws.34 A successful legal transplant, he noted, 
typically must overcome significant obstacles to thrive in a new legal 
system.35 In this way, “organic” transplants differ from “mechanical” 
                                                                                                     
 
 31. See Karen Knop, Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 501, 506 (2000). 
 32. Langer, supra note 16, at 40-41, 48 (Italian reforms gave prosecutors and defense 
attorneys the ability to conduct their own investigations, thereby replacing the 
preliminary investigation judge as the fact finder in the pretrial phase; but compare with 
German reforms, where the presiding trial judge is an active participant in pretrial 
agreements). 
 33. John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into Developing 
East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 657, 685 (2008); Ralf Michaels, Comparative Law 
by Numbers? Legal Origins Thesis, Doing Business Reports, and the Silence of Traditional 
Comparative Law, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 765, 781 (2009) (“Moreover, especially in 
non-Western countries, Western law has often mixed with domestic legal traditions, 
resulting in mutual influence.”); see generally Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-
Francois Richard, Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. 
ECON. REV. 165 (2003) (arguing that transplants need to be adapted to local conditions in 
order to be effective). 
 34. See Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L. Q. REV. 79 (1976); 
Ewald, supra note 15, at 491; William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 
J.L. & SOC'Y 203, 211-13 (2005). 
 35. See Watson, supra note 34; see also Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal 
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ones in requiring more attention to local conditions and the character of 
the proposed legal reform.36 The success of a legal transplant depends 
partly on the act of transplanting, the characteristics that inhere in the 
transplanted law itself, and the ability to graft onto existing legal norms 
and practices.37 Transplant theory thus directs our attention to the 
processual character of law in both the exporting and importing legal 
systems.38 
The transplanting of foreign laws by some countries, however, 
reveals a transplant bias, whereby importing state actors operate with 
an unthinking receptivity to foreign law because of social conditions 
such as the general prestige, linguistic accessibility, and the training 
and experience of local lawyers.39 Many of these factors have helped the 
transnational movement of U.S. law. Academic writers typically are 
most susceptible to the sway of grand foreign theories, whereas those 
following legal precedents are sometimes more resistant. Judges 
borrowing foreign rules will carefully weigh the pros and cons, while 
academics are more likely to be swept away by the logic of an elegant or 
innovative argument.40 Economic factors can also play an important 
role. Economic efficiency has proven to be a powerful engine driving the 
process of transplanting law in legal domains such as competition and 
estate law.41 
The process of transplanting law emphasizes domestic differences, 
especially between adversarial common law systems and their 
inquisitorial civil law counterparts. As David Sklansky observed, “if 
scholars of comparative law agree on anything, it is the hazards of legal 
                                                                                                     
Transplants,’ 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & COMP. L. 111 (1997) (discussing obstacles of such 
significance that the author views transplants are impossible). 
 36. See Kahn-Freund, supra note 19, at 5-7. 
 37. See SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: TRANSLATING 
INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE 134-78 (2006); Berkowitz, Pistor, & Richard, 
supra note 33, at 167. 
 38. See YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL 
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 
(1998) (exploring a variety of case studies involving international business law 
development and exchange between various countries and how this creates a process of 
transplanting systems). 
 39. Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313, 327 
(1978). 
 40. See, e.g., Ajani, supra note 1 (exampling a writer discussing legislation in Russia 
and Eastern Europe in a post-soviet era); Ewald, supra note 15, at 499 (exampling a 
writer discussing Alan Watson’s proposed theory of the growth of law being explained by 
transplantation of legal rules); Pierre Legrand, Against a European Civil Code, 60 MOD. L. 
REV. 44 (1997) (exampling a writer discussing European legal integration). 
 41. Ugo Mattei, Efficiency in Legal Transplants: An Essay in Comparative Law and 
Economics, 14 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3, 9 (1994) (looking at competition driving 
transplanting of law through examining trusts). 
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transplants,” most especially between civil and common-law systems.42 
Thus, the origin of a transplanted rule is one condition that can affect 
the process of legal transplanting. In general, transplants occur more 
readily within, rather than across, legal families.43 The 
institutionalization of different legal cultures accounts for the 
persistence of legal families over time.44 The closer states’ legal systems 
are in terms of cost structure and constitutive rules, the more likely 
those states are to look to each other for legal innovations.45 For 
example, though they lack an analysis of causal mechanisms specifying 
how transplants occur, correlational studies have shown a persistent 
relationship between legal family and observable phenomena such as 
financial development,46 government ownership of banks,47 burden of 
entry regulations,48 incidence of military conscription,49 government 
                                                                                                     
 
 42. David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1634, 1678 (2009). 
 43. For important explorations of this topic, see generally ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES 
(David Nelken & Johannes Feest, eds., 2001) (exploring the theme of changing legal 
culture by looking at ways cultures interact, influence, and change each other); Mirjan 
Damaška, The Uncertain Fate of Evidentiary Transplants: Anglo-American and 
Continental Experiments, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (1997) (examining two families of civil 
procedure); Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the 
Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813 (2009) (examining corporate and 
securities laws empirically to find diffusion of materials from core countries to periphery 
countries); Wolfgang Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 229 (1991) (looking generally at Swiss law).  
 44. See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7, at 286, 306-07 (“Legal 
Origins Theory has three basic ingredients”: (1) England and Continental Europe, 
particularly France, developed different methods to control business, (2) these styles of 
control and their corresponding legal institutions were transplanted to most of the world, 
and (3) although legal and regulatory change has occurred, these styles have proved 
persistent). 
 45. Aron Balas, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The 
Divergence of Legal Procedures, 1 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL. 138 (2009). 
 46. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, & Robert Vishny, 
Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131, 1149 (1997) (showing in a study 
of 49 countries, civil-law countries, in particular those countries that had inherited French 
civil-law, had weaker investor protections and less developed capital markets as compared 
to common law countries). 
 47. See, e.g. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
Government Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265 (2002). 
 48. See, e.g. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1 (2002). 
 49. See, e.g., Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, Conscription as Regulation, 7 AM. 
L. & ECON. REV. 85 (2005); Casey B. Mulligan & Andrei Shleifer, The Extent of the 
Market and the Supply of Regulation, 120 Q. J. ECON. 1445 (2005). 
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ownership of the media,50 formalism of judicial procedures,51 and 
judicial independence.52 
However, in a world of hybridization and syncretism with increasing 
transnational and international engagement, legal family is not 
destiny.53 Locating local law is no easier than identifying the causes, 
character, and consequences of processes of legal transplanting. 
Valuable historical scholarship has analyzed the distorting roles many 
colonial and neocolonial missionaries played in the outright fabrication 
of “indigenous” and “customary” local law.54 Much of what was treated 
by colonial jurists as extant local dispute resolution procedures was 
instead a political fabrication involving the converging interests of 
colonial officials and local elites.55 In the nineteenth century, it was 
                                                                                                     
 
 50. See, e.g. Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova & Andrei Shleifer, 
Who Owns the Media?, 46 J.L. & ECON. 341 (2003). 
 51. See, e.g. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei 
Shleifer, Courts, 118 Q. J. ECON. 453 (2003). 
 52. See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Christian Pop-Eleches & Andrei 
Shleifer, Judicial Checks and Balances, 112 J. POL. ECON. 445 (2004). For a review of 
country studies and the legal origin effects on particular areas of law, see generally La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7, at 292-93. These “legal origin” studies 
were attempts to find empirical support for institutional theories, which suggest that 
strong legal institutions are important prerequisites to economic development. See, e.g., 
DOUGLAS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
(1990). These studies, however, have received much criticism, including: (a) that the 
coding of countries in the 1997 paper was shown to be erroneous; see, e.g., Michaels, supra 
note 33, at 770-71 (recoded, common law origins were no longer superior); (b) that the 
studies do not account for a “transplant effect”; see Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra 
note 33, at 166 (the way law is transplanted and received is a stronger determinant of 
economic development than the legal origin theory); and (c) that legal origin studies do not 
account for subsequent reactions and interactions of and resultant institutional 
arrangements in colonial territories; see Ronald J. Daniels, Michael J. Trebilcock & 
Lindsey D. Carson, The Legacy of Empire: The Common Law Inheritance and 
Commitments to Legality in Former British Colonies, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 126 (2011) 
(“the colonial experience rather than the initial conditions of the colonized regions proves 
the decisive independent variable”). See also Curtis J. Milhaupt, Beyond Legal Origin: 
Rethinking Law's Relationship to the Economy-Implications for Policy, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 
831 (2009).  
 53. See Daniels, Trebilcock & Carson, supra note 52, at 174. 
 54. See Martin Chanock, The Law Market: the Legal Encounter in British East and 
Central Africa, in EUROPEAN EXPANSION AND LAW: THE ENCOUNTER OF EUROPEAN AND 
INDIGENOUS LAW IN 19TH AND 20TH CENTURY AFRICA AND ASIAN 279 (W.J. Mommsen & 
J.A. de Moor eds., 1992); MARTIN CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL 
CULTURE, 1902-36: FEAR, FAVOUR, AND PREJUDICE 248, 252 (2001); LAURA NADER, 
HARMONY IDEOLOGY: JUSTICE AND CONTROL IN A ZAPOTEC MOUNTAIN VILLAGE 10, 307 
(1990); Francis G. Snyder, Colonialism and Legal Form: The Creation of Customary Law 
in Senegal, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 49, 60 (1981). 
 55. T.W. Bennett, Comparative Law and African Customary Law, in OXFORD 
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quite difficult to “subtract the influence of the colonial system to 
unearth the ‘real’ authentic one.”56 This is even truer today. The 
autonomous internal development of a legal system, thus, is very much 
the exception, not the rule.57 Moreover, in the long-term, such 
exceptions create effective legal institutions and practices only when 
transplanted law is not imposed or copied, but developed internally 
through a process of trial and error.58 Few countries were born lucky. In 
most instances states have inherited their legal order from one of the 
existing legal families, either through forcible imposition, voluntary 
imitation, or more or less creative adaptation.59  
Today, it is rare that a dispute arises anywhere in the world in 
which a party can rightfully appeal to a self-contained legal system. 
Profoundly affected by transnational legal processes, laws within a 
single system typically derive from various sources and are thoroughly 
intertwined with one another. Legal syncretism through the 
                                                                                                     
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW, supra note 1, at 641, 665; Peter Fitzpatrick, 
Traditionalism and Traditional Law, 28 J. AFR. L. 20, 23 (1984); Sally Engle Merry, Law 
and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 889, 893 (1991) (“‘customary law’ was a product of 
the colonial period, shaped by the efforts of ‘native’ modernizing elites” and European 
officials); Ralf Michaels, Global Legal Pluralism, 5 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 243, 254-55 
(2009) (surveying the literature of the colonial construction or recognition of nonstate law: 
“The creation of colonial law was neither an innocuous nor a nonviolent act: For the 
colonizers, it created an order that was categorically similar and thus could be subjected to 
their own law; for the elites among the colonized, it opened up avenues toward reaffirming 
their own power”); Francis Snyder, Customary Law and the Economy, 28 J. AFR. L. 34, 35 
(1984) (“the notion of customary law was an ideology of colonial domination”); see 
CHANOCK, THE MAKING OF SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL CULTURE, 1902-36: FEAR, FAVOUR, AND 
PREJUDICE, supra note 54, at 34, 245-48; NADER, supra note 54, at 2, 5-6. 
 56. Sally Engle Merry, From Law and Colonialism to Law and Globalization, 28 LAW & 
SOC. INQ. 570, 572 (2003) (reviewing MARTIN CHANOCK, LAW, CUSTOM, AND SOCIAL 
ORDER: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE IN MALAWI AND ZAMBIA (1998)); see also Amr 
Shalakany, Sanhuri and the Historical Origins of Comparative Law in the Arab World (or 
How Sometimes Losing your Asalah can be Good for You), in RETHINKING THE MASTERS 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 157, 182 (Annelise Riles ed., 2001) (“[N]ostalgia for a return to a 
more authentic cultural past is itself an intellectually futile exercise—in the postcolonial 
world we live in, there is no going back to a precolonial home.”). 
 57. See Rodolfo Sacco, Legal Formants: A Dynamic Approach to Comparative Law 
(Installment I of II), 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 11 (1991).  
 58. See Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 33, at 167. 
 59. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, supra note 46, at 1131-32 (“Most 
countries have adopted their legal systems through occupation or colonization by one of 
the European powers to which they owe the origin of their laws”); La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7, at 290, 307 (although there are exceptions, 
including Japan, which voluntarily adopted the German legal system, and some Latin 
American countries, which were influenced by the French legal tradition after 
independence, the majority of legal transplants “is the product of conquest and 
colonization”); see generally Graziadei, supra note 1 (the most important factors in the 
movement of law are power, prestige, and economic efficiency).  
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transnational movement of law has replaced all straightforward 
distinctions of legal family.60 It is not the intrinsic differences between 
legal families, but the concatenation of different mechanisms of 
diffusion operating along and across the lines of institutional 
complementarity, linguistic familiarity, professional and educational 
affinity ties, and adherence to shared spheres of political influence, that 
lead to divergent or convergent outcomes.61  
B.  Translating 
Legal translation is always an exercise in conceptual translation.62 
The defining characteristics of different legal systems lie not only in 
linguistic differences, but also in the “structures of interpretation and 
meaning” that develop through legal education and practice and sheer 
repetition within the legal community, the courts, and the polity at 
large.63 Linguistic and conceptual equivalence in the translations 
between different legal systems is as unobtainable as it is between 
different literary traditions; the issue is not to find the right translation 
but instead to find a translation that is least wrong.64 This problem is as 
clear in the field of international politics as it is in the field of 
international law. When writing to Premier Nikita Khrushchev in 
November 1961, President John F. Kennedy expressed his predicament 
very cogently when he wrote: 
I am conscious of the difficulties you and I face in 
establishing full communication between our two minds. 
                                                                                                     
 
 60. Michaels, supra note 33, at 780-81 (“Even if defined in the narrow sense as systems 
with both common and civil law influences, mixed systems are the norm rather than the 
exception”); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 7, at 309 (“To reiterate, no 
country exhibits a system of social control that is an ideal type; all countries mix the two 
approaches. Common law countries are quite capable of civil law solutions, and vice 
versa.”). 
 61. See Brake & Katzenstein, supra note 3; see generally Gunther Teubner, Legal 
Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends Up in New Divergences, 
61 MOD. L. REV. 11 (1998) (arguing that legal transplants irritate law’s “binding 
arrangements,” triggering new and unexpected events). 
 62. Langer, supra note 16, at 5-6; Sacco, supra note 57, at 12-16; see Gillespie, supra 
note 33, at 686.  
 63. See Langer, supra note 16, at 9-11. For a paired comparison of translating and 
transplanting in the case of Britain and France, see J.W.F. ALLISON, A CONTINENTAL 
DISTINCTION IN THE COMMON LAW: A HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE ON 
ENGLISH PUBLIC LAW (1996); SÁNDOR HERVEY & IAN HIGGINS, THINKING TRANSLATION: A 
COURSE IN TRANSLATION METHOD: FRENCH TO ENGLISH (1992). 
 64. See SUSAN BASSNETT-MCGUIRE, TRANSLATION STUDIES 37-38 (1980). 
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This is not a question of translation but a question of the 
context in which we hear and respond . . . . [T]hese 
differences create a great gulf in communications 
because language cannot mean the same thing on both 
sides unless it relates to some underlying purpose.65  
Thus, translation problems do not occur only when states act in 
their capacities as the guardians of law. Translation problems arise also 
within the discursive politics and political struggles that mark legal 
change in practices that often lie beyond the confines of the state.66 
The problem of legal translation can occur even within a single 
cultural context operating with a shared language and uniform legal 
tradition.67 For example, the simple task of “translating English legal 
language into standard[, comprehensible] English” prose poses 
considerable difficulties when “legal phrases or terms are imprecise or 
open to interpretation.”68 Translation problems are compounded by the 
existence of false legal cognates and the fact that the cognitive 
relationship “between word and concept is often not identical in . . . 
different legal languages.”69 Even though U.S. and British legal systems 
share many important similarities, legal standards and burdens of proof 
can vary.70 The difficulties of successful legal translation arise also 
outside the English-speaking world. Austrian German and German 
                                                                                                     
 
 65. Letter From President Kennedy to Chairman Khrushchev (Nov. 16, 1961), quoted 
in Matthew Hill, Introduction, in THE LANGUAGES OF SECURITY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC: CASE 
STUDIES (Desmond Ball et al. eds., forthcoming 2013). The concept of translation exists 
also in organizational sociology typically focusing on practices more generally. See JOHN L. 
CAMPBELL, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND GLOBALIZATION 79-86, 163-67 (2004) (discussing 
translations in mechanisms for change). 
 66. See John Gillespie, Towards a Discursive Analysis of Legal Transfers into 
Developing East Asia, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 657, 659-61 (2008). 
 67. See M.H. Hoeflich, Translation & the Reception of Foreign Law in the Antebellum 
United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2002) (discussing that even with a shared language 
of English there were issues with translations of texts from other languages from which 
lawyers could learn from). 
 68. See Sylvia A. Smith, Culture Clash: Anglo-American Case Law and German Civil 
Law in Translation, in VIII TRANSLATION AND THE LAW 179, 180 (Marshall Morris ed., 
1995). 
 69. Sofie M.F. Geeroms, Comparative Law and Legal Translation: Why the Terms 
Cassation, Revision and Appeal Should Not Be Translated, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 201, 202 
(2002). 
 70. See, e.g., Brid Jordan, The Modernization of English Libel Laws and Online 
Publication, 14 NO. 7 J. INTERNET L. 3 (2011) (discussing libel law varies and is continuing 
to change). 
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legal languages also differ in important respects.71 Similarly, due to 
broader historical, political, and cultural differences, legal French 
deployed in France and Africa can differ substantially and generate its 
own distinctive problems of translation.72 Languages and legal 
sublanguages thus coexist. Legal translations occur between British 
English and American English, German German and Austrian German, 
and French French and Francophone French.73  
The problem of translation is similarly acute in the field of 
international law. The Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, for example, exists in three original versions—English, 
French, and Spanish—with each considered to be equally authentic, 
even though they embody unavoidably different textual meanings.74 
Similarly, the French law of légitime defense has developed a much 
richer approach to self-defense than can be found in the 
English-language case law.75 It is therefore very important whether one 
follows the French or the English version of the United Nations Charter 
Article 51 limiting the use of force.76 In the context of diplomatic 
negotiations, differences in interpretations can narrow but not resolve 
altogether such translation problems. And like international diplomacy, 
legal translation records and creates ongoing conversations and 
negotiations among actors in search of practical solutions. In doing so it 
establishes contingent and evolving systems of shared reference.  
The ubiquity of English as a lingua franca is of great relevance to 
issues of translation. Today, native speakers and foreign-language users 
of English total about one-fifth of the world’s population, with the 
largest national concentration now living in China.77 Communities of 
lawyers, judges, and academics can no longer ignore the currents of 
thought expressed in U.S. or common law and scholarship, thus 
accelerating the rapid spread of the legal theories and practices in both 
public and private law iterations of common (rather than civil) law. 
Indeed, the preeminent role of English is increasingly marginalizing all 
legal systems that do not articulate their rules, judgments, and 
                                                                                                     
 
 71. Uwe Kischel, Legal Cultures–Legal Languages, in TRANSLATION ISSUES IN 
LANGUAGE AND LAW 7, 9 (Frances Olsen, Alexander Lorz & Dieter Stein eds., 2009). 
 72. See EVANDRO MENEZES DE CARVALHO, SEMIOTICS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 77 
(2011). 
 73. See Kischel, supra note 71, at 9 (discussing German and English). 
 74. See MENEZES DE CARVALHO, supra note 72, at xvi. 
 75. GEORGE P. FLETCHER & JENS DAVID OHLIN, DEFENDING HUMANITY: WHEN FORCE 
IS JUSTIFIED AND WHY at viii (2008). 
 76. Id. 
 77. See DAVID CRYSTAL, ENGLISH AS A GLOBAL LANGUAGE 4-5 (1997) (listing statistics 
of the number of English speakers). 
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commentaries in English. To cite just one example, though the 
fundamental rights provisions of the South African constitution of 1994 
are modeled on the German Basic Law, they are increasingly 
interpreted with regard to the more accessible English-language 
material emanating from common law systems. 78 
 
 
 
II.  THE SPREAD OF U.S. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE INTO DOMESTIC LEGAL 
SPHERES 
David Hume once noted that “there are in every case very great 
obstacles to the transferring of the Criminal Law of any one nation to 
another.”79 Though obstacles to the movement of law remain, even in 
the radically transformed legal landscape of the twenty-first century, 
Hume’s comment overlooks the considerable degree to which criminal 
procedure laws have spread successfully to new jurisdictions.80 There 
are many theoretical and empirical reasons to expect, as Hume did, that 
transnational efforts to reform criminal procedure will fail. Firstly, 
procedural laws comprise the characteristic features of a legal family. It 
follows, some scholars maintain, that the movement of criminal 
procedure between legal families is something to fear due to risks of 
generating “the constitutional equivalent of introducing rabbits into 
Australia.”81 Secondly, criminal procedure is linked to the ability of a 
central government to exert control over its citizens—i.e. “high 
politics”—and thus should be relatively immune to transnational 
forces.82 Rules governing the rights of accused criminals lie close to 
issues related to national security, leaving many to expect foreign actors 
to be ineffective advocates for change.83 Beth Simmons, for example, 
                                                                                                     
 
 78. Oliver Brand, Language as a Barrier to Comparative Law, in TRANSLATION ISSUES 
IN LANGUAGE AND LAW, supra note 71, at 18, 20. 
 79. DAVID HUME, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND RESPECTING CRIMES 16 
(The Law Society of Scotland reprt. ed. 1986) (1819). 
 80. See WATSON, supra note 1, at 105. 
 81. Sklansky, supra note 42, at 1678 (quoting Ronald J. Allen & Ross M. Rosenberg, 
The Fourth Amendment and the Limits of Theory: Local Versus General Theoretical 
Knowledge, 72 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1149, 1161 (1998)). 
 82. See Robert Gilpin, The Politics of Transnational Economic Relations, 
TRANSNATIONAL RELATIONS AND WORLD POLITICS 33 (Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye, 
Jr. eds., 1973).  
 83. See BETH A. SIMMONS, MOBILIZING FOR HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL LAW IN 
DOMESTIC POLITICS 15 (2009). 
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notes that criminal procedural rights have broad implications for the 
coercive abilities of a political regime.84 As such, governments are likely 
to avoid international commitments that might “endanger their grip on 
power or the ‘stability’ of the broader polity.”85  
Though the transnational movement of criminal procedure is 
multidirectional and comprised of a diverse cast of legal entrepreneurs, 
the influence of U.S. law is observable in the spread of two legal 
practices associated with criminal justice in the United States: trials by 
jury and the plea bargain. The popularity of jury trials, described by the 
U.S. Supreme Court as “fundamental to the American scheme of 
justice,”86 has surged in recent years among a diverse set of legal 
systems, despite popular perceptions of the institution as a key source of 
the long delays and great costs associated with adversarial trials.87 
Currently, at least fifty-four countries use jury trials, including Russia 
and Spain, which recently reintroduced jury trials, as well as South 
Korea as of 2008, and the newly independent Georgia, which enacted 
legislation enabling jury trials in 2009 and held its first jury trial in 
2011.88 In many instances, the socialization of foreign legal scholars 
from post-authoritarian countries at U.S. law schools,89 at conferences,90 
or through collaborative research networks,91 drives the spread of the 
jury trial. As an anecdotal example, Makheil Saakashvili, the third 
                                                                                                     
 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). 
 87. Lempert, supra note 3, at 478. 
 88. Nancy S. Marder, An Introduction to Comparative Jury Systems, 86 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 453, 454 (2011) (discussing Russia and Spain, among others); Park, supra note 6, at 
530 (outlining the reforms in South Korea); Neil Vidmar, A Historical and Comparative 
Perspective On the Common Law Jury, in WORLD JURY SYSTEMS 1 (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000) 
(discussing expansion of the English empire and its introduction of jury trials to different 
countries). 
 89. Lempert, supra note 3, at 480 (noting the spread of juries to the postauthoritarian 
countries of Japan, Korea, Russia, Spain, and South Africa); Park, supra note 6, at 551-52 
(arguing that “legal elites who study and conduct research abroad are the primary 
conveyers of foreign legal ideas, practices, and institutions,” particularly with respect to 
the spread of the jury trial to Korea). 
 90. See Valerie P. Hans, Introduction: Citizens as Legal Decision Makers: An 
International Perspective, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 303, 309-313 (2007) (discussing the role 
of the Clark Business Law Institute at Cornell Law School in bringing together scholars 
studying lay participation in Japan, Korea, China, and Thailand). 
 91. See Marder, supra note 88, at 454 (noting that “the Law & Society Association 
(LSA), and in particular its Lay Participation in Legal Systems Collaborative Research 
Network (CRN) and Lay Participation in Law International Research Collaborative 
(IRC),” facilitates the transnational movement of scholarship between the United States 
and foreign jury scholars). 
 THE MOVEMENT OF U.S. CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 159 
President of Georgia and former Minister of Justice, pursued advanced 
degrees in law at Columbia University and George Washington 
University.92 For its jury system, Georgia contracted the U.S. Center for 
Jury Studies at the National Center for State Courts to draft a jury 
management plan, including recommendations regarding procedures for 
summoning jurors, training court personnel, and orienting individuals 
to trial by jury.93 In some countries, transplanting jury trials has been 
part of a genuine attempt to embrace democratic reforms and market 
liberalization, or has been a strategic signal of this embrace.94 This 
postauthoritarian democratization of the judiciary is another instance of 
transplants extending beyond the legal families distinction. Spain, 
Portugal, and the province of Córdoba in Argentina have all adopted the 
jury model even though civil law jurisdictions typically employ mixed 
tribunals with professional judges and lay persons who sit and decide 
cases together.95 
Asia exemplifies both the effects of translating legal procedures and 
the limits to U.S. legal imperialism. South Korea, which is generally 
receptive to ideas and practices from the United States, engaged in a 
process of picking and choosing, translating aspects of both German and 
U.S. lay participation systems.96 Japan investigated both jury and 
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mixed tribunal models before instituting the Saiban-in Seido.97 A 
subcommittee of the Osaka Bar Association's Committee for Judicial 
System Reform toured the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, 
and several judges of the Supreme Court of Japan traveled to the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France.98 Even 
though Japan had a jury system from 1928 to 1943, it adopted the 
mixed judge/lay person model more common in civil law jurisdictions.99  
Surprisingly, the spread of juries has occurred just as their use in 
America has nearly vanished. Only about two percent of federal 
criminal cases in 2010 were tried before a jury.100 The decline of jury 
trials in the United States is due largely to the rise of plea bargaining, 
which, at its simplest, involves a negotiation through which a 
prosecutor and defense attorney consent to resolve criminal charges 
without a trial or enter into an agreement over the defendant’s 
punishment.101 This device, which allocates considerable power to 
prosecutors, is not without controversy. Michelle Alexander, a civil 
rights advocate and associate professor of law at Ohio State University, 
attributes the United States’s “era of mass incarceration” to a system in 
which more than 90 percent of federal and state convictions are the 
result of a guilty plea.102 Other U.S. scholars have condemned it as 
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“morally and politically unjust.”103 Though jurists overseas have 
likewise criticized this quintessentially U.S. practice for the coercive 
benefits it offers to prosecutors, variants of plea bargaining have spread 
globally.104  
The spread of plea bargaining mechanisms is significant because it 
requires more than a mere procedural change. As a tool tailored for 
adversarial systems, the movement of plea bargaining from a common 
to a civil law system transforms the functions of lawyers and challenges 
popular perceptions of the purpose of the legal system.105 Both systems 
are characterized by different apportionments of power among the 
principal actors and by different conceptions of the purpose of criminal 
justice. In adversarial systems, criminal procedure governs disputes 
between the prosecution and defense before a judge serving as an 
impartial adjudicator.106 In inquisitorial systems, court officials are 
better understood not as mediators of disputes but as impartial 
overseers tasked with uncovering the truth.107 The guilty plea 
traditionally did not exist in the inquisitorial model because the truth 
was for the judge to determine and not something to be negotiated 
between the prosecutor and defense counsel.108 As Maximo Langer 
describes, “there are few practices that are more incompatible with the 
inquisitorial system and the model of the official investigation than plea 
bargaining.”109 
It should be noted that while elements of U.S.-style plea bargaining 
have spread—from Russia, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to 
Germany, Italy, France, Guatemala, Costa Rica, and Argentina110—
U.S.-style plea bargaining has not arrived in new jurisdictions 
unchanged. In each new legal system, the device undergoes a process of 
translation that alters the practice of plea bargaining as well as the 
receiving legal system itself.111 Nonetheless, while a number of plea 
bargaining regimes that have emerged depart from the U.S. model, the 
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popularity of its basic elements reveals the influence of the United 
States in the area of legal change.  
A survey of recent adopters of plea bargaining suggests the United 
States wields its influence through means that are both direct (e.g., 
state-sponsored programs) and indirect (e.g., socialization in classrooms, 
courtrooms, law firms, and conferences).112 In attempting to shape legal 
development directly, U.S. support ranges from financial support of 
legal aid clinics to the deployment of prosecutors and law enforcement 
officers abroad.113 A principal aim of these efforts is to transform the 
inquisitorial systems of Latin American and ex-Soviet states into close 
cousins of the adversarial U.S. style.114 In the cases of Georgia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example, each country received assistance 
in the form of attorneys sent by the U.S. Department of Justice Office of 
Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance, and Training. These 
attorneys, Cynthia Alkon notes, “bring with them certain ideas of how a 
legal system should work; [f]or many, this includes a system of plea 
bargaining as a method of case management.”115 Since the 1980s, as 
many as twenty-one Latin American countries received major loan 
assistance from the United States for criminal procedure reform as well 
as assistance in the form of technical expertise, legal materials, and 
training.116 By 2006, fourteen of those countries adopted new criminal 
procedure codes based in part on the U.S. adversarial model.117 Though 
shepherded into the region in part through an elite network of Latin 
American lawyers rather than imposed top-down through U.S. efforts, 
U.S. legal actors “played a crucial role in the spread of [criminal justice] 
reforms.”118  
In parts of Europe, the U.S. influence was more indirect. For 
example, when overwhelming criminal dockets triggered calls for 
swifter resolution of cases, Italian reformers yielded to the prestige and 
deep cultural influence of U.S. law and legal scholarship.119 This 
indirect influence has been felt in legal systems around the world 
through the expansion of U.S. law firms, the growing number of foreign 
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LL.M. students in the United States, the expanding electronic 
availability of U.S. jurisprudence and scholarship, and the proliferation 
of U.S.-funded professional associations and standing conferences.120  
A.  U.S. Criminal Procedure and Legal Reform in China 
To understand the direct and indirect ways through which U.S. 
criminal procedure law moves into new jurisdictions, it is helpful to 
examine a “hard case” of legal reform.121 In 1997, when China 
underwent its first sweeping reform of criminal procedure law (CPL) in 
the post-Mao era, China adopted the so-called “summary procedure,” a 
practice that resembles aspects of the American plea-bargaining 
system.122 As described below, the surprising adoption of this device is 
the result of the direct and indirect efforts to expose Chinese legal 
reformers to U.S. legal norms and practices.  
As a civil law country, in which the act of legal innovation falls to 
legal scholars more than it does to judges, the process of legal reform is 
best explained through an examination of China’s expanding pool of law 
professors and legal experts. Despite the historical legacy of an 
inquisitorial legal system and a long-standing suspicion of U.S. rule of 
law efforts, a survey of legal periodicals suggests that, by the time of the 
1997 CPL reforms, China had already developed considerable support 
for the adoption of U.S.-style plea-bargaining. By the mid-1990s, many 
scholars were already lauding elements in the U.S. criminal procedure 
law, such as “the Anglo-American adversarial system” and “Anglo-
American plea-bargaining,”123 while recognizing the foreign roots of 
these elements.124  
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Contrary to Hume’s pessimism about the ability of criminal law to 
move across jurisdictions, Chinese criminal procedure reform reveals 
the powerful influence of U.S. legal ideas and illustrates the accretive 
effects of exposure to and interaction with U.S. law. This article 
describes below the gradual opening of China’s legal community to U.S. 
law and illustrates how this exposure created a body of experts more 
familiar and comfortable with the U.S. model.  
The exposure to U.S. legal practices of the codebooks of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) began soon after Mao’s death when growing 
numbers of Chinese scholars began traveling to the United States.125 
Sponsored by the U.S.-based Committee on Legal Educational Exchange 
with China (CLEEC), with funding from various U.S.-supported 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), more than 200 Chinese 
students and scholars participated in legal training in the United States 
during the 1980s and early 1990s.126 By 1988, the Ford Foundation 
became the first international NGO to establish an office in China.127  
This growing familiarity with U.S. law grew deeper in subsequent 
years. As criminal procedure scholar Chen Ruihua described it, 
beginning in the 1980s, legal studies in China underwent “a gradual 
decrease in political interference and ideological restrictions.”128 Chinese 
universities convened numerous conferences at which U.S. criminal law 
scholars met with Chinese counterparts.129 Participants included 
representatives of U.S.-supported efforts such as the U.S.-China Rule of 
Law Initiative,130 bar associations,131 the Ford Foundation,132 and the 
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Asia Foundation.133 In addition to these domestic exchanges, more 
Chinese legal academics enrolled in U.S. law schools. Before the rule of 
law became a high profile issue in the U.S.–China governmental agenda 
in the late 1990s, the CLEEC and other like-minded organizations were 
sponsoring the U.S. legal education of Chinese academics.134 By 2002, 
students from the CLEEC program headed at least six of China’s top 
law schools.135 This biased exposure to U.S. law accounts for why 
reforms in the field of criminal law include so many common-law terms, 
such as intent, recklessness, knowledge, negligence, foreseeability, and 
causation.136 
As the number of Chinese legal academics familiar with U.S. 
criminal procedure law grew, so too did the number of institutions 
through which these ideas could spread. Between 1977 and 1995, the 
number of law schools in China rose from as few as two to more than 
one hundred,137 many of which engaged deeply with their U.S. 
counterparts. Among the top ten law schools in China in 2010,138 several 
were directed by deans with extensive experience in the United States 
in the form of serving as visiting scholars or publishing in English-
language law journals.139 
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Chinese legal scholars directly involved in criminal procedure 
reform were among those increasingly exposed to U.S. law. In 1992, 
Chen Guangzhong, a leading criminal procedure scholar, received 
funding from China’s National Social Sciences Fund to study foreign 
criminal procedure systems in advance of China’s criminal procedure 
reform.140 Chen and his team of scholars were well positioned to play 
the role of transnational legal brokers. Indeed, as estimated by one 
senior participant in the research team, roughly one-third of the group 
led by Chen had prior overseas experience with foreign law.141 Of the 
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remaining members, almost all had PhDs in law and extensive exposure 
to comparative law and the U.S. legal community present in Beijing.142  
In October of 1993, the Criminal Law Department of the Legislative 
Affairs Commission (LAC), a body which can delegate legislative 
drafting to experts, formally tasked the team of scholars led by Chen to 
compose a first draft of the revised CPL. With the support of the Ford 
Foundation, it convened several conferences in Beijing with foreign 
experts, all of whom, one participant recalled, were extremely 
influential in shaping the views of the research team.143 Especially 
influential were those from the United States and the sources they 
supplied.144 This influence was due in large part to the linguistic skills 
of the participants. While some spoke German, Japanese, or Russian, 
most spoke and read English.145 Moreover, at least 70 percent of these 
scholars already had legal experiences abroad, primarily in the United 
States.146 The more exposure to the United States these scholars had, 
the more likely they were to incorporate U.S. procedure explicitly into 
their suggestions for criminal procedure reform.147 By July of the 
following year, Professor Chen submitted a draft law, almost all of 
which was adopted, including the plea-bargain-like “summary 
procedure.”148  
This quick survey of criminal procedure reform in the post-Mao 
period provides an illustration of the direct and indirect means through 
which the United States affects the development of law in the 
international system. Much of this power is wielded via traditional 
means such as generously funded government-led assistance programs 
like the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, a division of the 
U.S. Department of Justice that deploys U.S. legal advisors abroad, and 
U.S. Agency for International Development rule of law initiatives. More 
subtle—though no less effective—manifestations of this power are felt 
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less directly through U.S.-funded NGOs such as the Ford Foundation 
and, even more indirectly, through the exposure of foreign legal scholars 
to U.S. law and scholarship in classrooms, courtrooms, law firms, and 
conferences. 
III.  THE SPREAD OF U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW INTO THE INTERNATIONAL 
LEGAL SPHERE 
A second area to search for the influence of the United States in the 
transnational movement of public law is the domain of global 
regulation, where aspects of U.S. administrative law procedures have 
been translated into the fragmented and varied landscape of global 
governance. Legal and quasi-legal mechanisms both channel149 and 
order the global economy,150 and both formal and informal methods of 
regulation address transnational concerns relating to the environment, 
security, health, immigration, and labor.151 These issues are governed 
by a diverse set of governmental and nongovernmental actors,152 and 
through a variety of mechanisms and legal nodes; which fuse private 
and public,153 international and domestic,154 and hard and soft 
approaches to law.155 Global regulation includes activities at 
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and “Public” Corporate Codes of Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617, 633 (2011). 
See generally Riles, supra note 10 (showing the similarity in how participants in public 
and private institutions conceive of their regulatory activities). 
 154. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Earth As Eggshell Victim: A Global Perspective on 
Domestic Regulation, 102 YALE L. J. 2107, 2119 (1993). 
 155. For references that include standards and other nonbinding but forceful governing 
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international institutions, within transnational regulatory networks 
that include domestic administrative agencies, and through regulatory 
regimes structured by treaties or other such agreements.156  
The development of this global regulatory framework is neither a 
bottom-up extension of domestic administrative law nor a top-down 
“Americanization”157 of global law.158 It is, rather, marked by “horizontal 
processes of international diffusion and policy transfer” and 
sociocultural processes of diffusion, emulation, and network 
formation.159 International advocacy networks160 consisting of 
academic,161 business, and professional networks162 influence the 
transfer and reception of U.S. legal procedures.163 In constructing a 
global regulatory framework, state and nonstate actors thus have 
assisted in transplanting and translating U.S. legal procedures,164 
specifically U.S. review mechanisms. Among other effects, this has 
                                                                                                     
mechanisms, see, for example, Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in ELGAR 
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 156. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart & Jonathan B. 
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international regulatory regimes); Aman, supra note 154, at 2111-16 (discussing “Global 
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 157. See, e.g., Wolfgang Wiegand, Americanization of Law: Reception or Convergence?, 
in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 137 (Lawrence M Friedman & Harry N 
Scheiber eds., 1996); and Kagan, supra note 151; R. Daniel Kelemen & Eric C. Sibbitt, The 
Americanization of Japanese Law, 23 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 269 (2002). 
 158. See Stewart, supra note 156. 
 159. Schneiberg & Bartley, supra note 150, at 39. 
 160. See David Vogel & Robert A. Kagan, An Introduction, in DYNAMICS OF 
REGULATORY CHANGE: HOW GLOBALIZATION AFFECTS NATIONAL REGULATORY POLICIES 1, 
11 (Robert A. Kagan & David Vogel eds., 2002). 
 161. See infra pp. 169-80 (regarding judicial review). 
 162. See Dezalay & Garth, Marketing and Selling Transnational ‘Judges’ and Global 
‘Experts’: Building the Credibility of (Quasi)Judicial Regulation, supra note 16, at 119 
(arguing that judges, multinational firms, and business litigators promote U.S. style 
litigation approach to international commercial arbitration); Schneiberg & Bartley, supra 
note 150, at 40 (explaining that lawyers and consultants act as verifiers of compliance 
with transnational standards and tailor transnational governance to suit clients’ needs). 
 163. See Sassen, supra note 151, at 63; Ole Hammerslev, The European Union and the 
United States in Eastern Europe: Two Ways of Exporting Law, Expertise and State power, 
in LAWYERS AND THE RULE OF LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION supra note 5, at 134, 136. 
 164. See, e.g., Sassen, supra note 151, at 53; Slaughter, supra note 152, at 129-31. 
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assisted in the creation of an international “juristocracy”165 reflected in 
a growing reliance on judicial and other adjudicative decision makers as 
reviewers of public action.  
The transplanting of domestic administrative law into international 
or global activity faces several obstacles. First, domestic administrative 
law is connected to the specific organization of political administration 
and the particular choices a state makes with respect to managing its 
economic, political, cultural, and social goals.166 In contrast to company 
law,167 investor protection,168 or the regulation of hate speech,169 
administrative law is a diffuse area of law connected to a diverse set of 
interactions, with the boundaries of what is or is not included differing 
across states.170 In addition, global administration and regulation is 
often informal, with institutions only having the power to make 
recommendations, as opposed to binding rules.171  
An even greater obstacle facing the transplant of U.S. 
administrative legal procedures into the global sphere is the lack of 
centralized governing bodies and governed constituencies.172 In domestic 
                                                                                                     
 
 165. See Carol Harlow, Global Administrative Law: The Quest for Principles and 
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 170. See Jacques Ziller, Public Law, in ELGAR ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW, 
supra note 114, at 603, 604. 
 171. Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence of Global 
Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15, 53-54 (2005). 
 172. See Nico Krisch, The Pluralism of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 
247, 250 (2006) (arguing that the label “accountability deficit” is misleading in that 
organizations and institutions are accountable but may be accountable to the wrong 
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administrative law, administrative action is defined as state acts that 
are neither legislative nor judicial (thus requiring some other 
mechanism for accountability).173 The rationale for a domestic 
administrative law is the protection of individual citizens’ interests 
against diffuse decision-making and disciplinary powers. At its core, 
administrative law is a set of procedural protections or due process 
principles to protect “the public interest” as citizens engage with 
delegated government authority.174 These protections may include 
requirements that notice be given when rights or privileges will be 
affected by government action, as well as the right to be heard or to 
make representations, and the right to a review by an impartial 
adjudicator. All of these measures attempt to control public power based 
on the rule of law and foundational democratic principles.175 Because a 
state-citizen relationship is absent,176 the movement of administrative 
law to mediate global governing relations is more accurately categorized 
as a functional translation to control legally binding or effective 
authority.177  
Several different types of actors participate in transplanting U.S. 
legal procedures into global governance. Federal regulatory officials 
influence the types of procedures adopted when serving on delegations 
that negotiate transnational or international treaties.178 Lawyers act as 
“brokers,” “converting social, political and economic resources into legal 
processes.”179 In addition, scholars and academics who seek to classify 
and improve the world around them articulate and crystallize a set of 
norms that can then be translated into the international arena.180 In the 
                                                                                                     
 
 173. Kingsbury, Krisch & Stewart, supra note 171, at 17. 
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 180. See, for example, Catherine Weaver, The Meaning of Development, Constructing 
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case of global governance, scholars are engaged in mapping legal 
taxonomies onto international institutions and regulatory regimes. Thus 
they seek to infuse discussions and decisions regarding international 
commercial activity and regulation with democratic norms like 
transparency and accountability. Projects, such as New York 
University’s Global Administrative Law Project,181 or the international 
constitutional law movement,182 bring scholars together in conversation 
to share analysis and solutions to common concerns.183  
As a result, administrative legal procedures are translated into 
global governance in three ways. First, procedures may be expressly 
included in laws, treaties, or other legal structures that coordinate and 
facilitate cross-border activity, or they may be implied through judicial 
decisions extending the territorial application of regulations.184 Second, 
as part of efforts to enhance their legitimacy, international 
organizations and institutions may adopt due process or fairness 
procedures.185 Third, transnational normative networks may be 
successful in transplanting and translating domestic procedures into 
norms or values that achieve broad international support.186 
                                                                                                     
the World Bank’s Good Governance Agenda, in CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 47 (Rawi Abdelal et al. eds., 2010) and Alvaro Santos, The World Bank’s Uses of 
the “Rule of Law” Promise in Economic Development, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC 
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Bank. 
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 182. See Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Functional Approach to International 
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 183. For an excellent review of the various projects and literatures trying to capture the 
normative space opened by the global regulatory field, see David Kennedy, The Mystery of 
Global Governance, in RULING THE WORLD?: CONSTITUTIONALISM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, supra note 182, at 37. 
 184. See Stewart, supra note 156, at 75-77 (application of U.S. administrative law 
directly to actions of international regulatory regimes). 
 185. Harlow, supra note 165, at 191. 
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Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000, in THE 
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Scholars of global regulation and administrative law cite several 
examples of the presence of administrative legal procedures in 
transnational or international institutions and global regulatory 
regimes. These include judicial review functions at the European Court 
of Justice;187 notice and comment procedures adopted by the Basel 
Committee of central banks188 and by The Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the United States when 
engaged in international standard setting;189 inspection panels at the 
World Bank investigating allegations of fraud or corruption and 
allegations of misconduct by staff members; and internal review 
procedures adopted by the Security Council allowing presentations 
regarding Al-Qaeda/Taliban asset-freezing sanctions.190 One place in 
particular to look for the influence of U.S. administrative law on global 
governance mechanisms is the spread of judicial review procedures to 
settle disputes or assess decisions of state actors and international 
organizations. Yet, different iterations or institutional models for review 
compete for primacy in global governance. Moreover, judicial review as 
a procedure to protect individual rights has a mixed record of reception 
in the international legal sphere.  
U.S. Administrative Law and Judicial Review 
The fragmented quality of U.S. administrative authority finds its 
origins in the New Deal era when the federal government created a 
diverse set of independent regulatory agencies, such as the Interstate 
Commerce Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency, to 
manage economic growth and social welfare.191 U.S. administrative law 
has several distinctive features, including legal sanctions that allow for 
civil and criminal penalties for regulatory violations,192 detailed and 
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complicated rules prescribing agency rule and decision-making 
procedures, and public participation (public comment and objections).193 
Judicial review by ordinary or unspecialized courts as an effort to 
curtail administrative discretion by threat of judicial reversal of agency 
decisions,194 however, is thought to be one of the most distinctive 
features of U.S. administrative law.195  
As NGOs and interest groups use courts as an “alternative policy 
forum for seeking policy goals,” U.S. judges are thought to be “bolder in 
scrutinizing and reversing governmental plans, regulations, practices, 
and decisions.”196 Characterized by judicial review and separation of 
powers, U.S. administrative law stands in contrast to the “bureaucratic 
legalism” of continental Europe and nonlegalistic, 
hierarchically-organized modes of policy-making.197 Specifically, one can 
contrast U.S. judicial review with the French model of the 
administrative judge who works from inside the administration to 
develop norms and policy, the Scandinavian institution of 
Ombudsperson,198 or the German emphasis on proportionality of 
decisions (as opposed to a focus on procedural requirements).199  
The statutory basis for judicial review is found in the 
Administrative Procedure Act,200 enacted in 1946. Initially, judges were 
restrained in their review, according deference to administrative 
agencies that were set up during the depression and as part of the New 
Deal.201 National agencies acted under delegated authority that enabled 
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them to carry out executive, legislative, and adjudicative powers to 
foster regulatory experimentation and “creative expert decisions.”202 
With growing demands for more activist state involvement in social 
regulation, throughout the 1960s and 1970s the level of power delegated 
to administrative agencies increased.203 To curtail increased agency 
discretion, politicians ensured that enabling legislation included 
detailed rule-making provisions and procedural requirements. These 
included provisions for giving notice to and allowing comment by 
affected stakeholders, in addition to making wide allowances for public 
participation.204 At the same time, judicial scrutiny of agency decisions 
increased and courts extended the meaning of standing to challenge 
agency action in court, allowing for legal challenges by regulated 
agencies and NGOs.205 From a comparative perspective, U.S. regulation 
is arguably more adversarial both in the enforcement of regulations,206 
and in procedures for challenging state action. 
Several international organizations and transnational institutions 
have active judicial review procedures. The Court of First Instance 
(CFI) of the European Union allowed hearings on EU decisions to 
implement U.N. Security Council sanctions.207 The European Court of 
Justice (ECJ) extended the meaning of “direct effect” and heard cases 
brought by advocacy organizations against member states for violations 
of EU directives on environmental protection.208 Not surprisingly, the 
European transnational courts emulate the Continental model of 
specialized and separate review courts rather than U.S.-style judicial 
review. In the case of the ECJ specifically, judicial review of EU action 
is based on the same concept of legality as the French Conseil d’Etat.209 
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Effectively, review of state action has been written into the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) under sections 1116 and 
1117, which allow investors to bring claims for breach of substantive 
obligations. Thus, a developer of a hazardous waste station was able to 
seek review by a NAFTA tribunal of a Mexican provincial government 
decision to issue an Ecological Decree for the protection of a rare 
cactus.210 On the other hand, judicial review of arbitration awards under 
NAFTA may be limited depending on which arbitration rules apply to 
the investor’s claim.211 Judicial review by a domestic court is also 
available to an individual affected by a decision by the International 
Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) 
regarding the registration of an international trademark.212 
Some scholars have looked to the procedures and substantive 
decisions of the World Trade Organization (WTO) for examples of the 
movement of U.S.-style judicial review into global and transnational 
regulation.213 The WTO has become particularly judicialized through 
the Disputes Settlement Understanding (DSU), which was included in 
the Uruguay Round agreements and gives adjudicative tribunals 
internal to the WTO enhanced binding and final powers of review.214 
While previous panel reports could be overturned by one veto, reports of 
the Dispute Settlement Body hold unless there is a unanimous vote to 
overturn.215 The DSU also enables review of panel decisions on issues of 
law by a standing appellate body.216 Nevertheless, in the absence of 
“direct effect,” which would allow individuals rather than governments 
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to bring actions before the WTO, the Dispute Settlement Body and 
Appellate Body are not true judicial review bodies.217  
The WTO appellate body’s 1998 review of U.S. regulations requiring 
shrimp trawling vessels to use approved turtle excluder devices 
demonstrates the complicated nature of the transnational movement of 
law.218 In contrast to theories about the Americanization of law or 
unfettered U.S. hegemony in global commerce, the Shrimp Turtle case 
highlights the potential capture and use of U.S. procedures by 
competing interests.219 U.S. domestic attempts to enact measures to 
protect the environment are reviewable by judicialized international 
institutions in much the same way as they would be by a domestic 
judicial review process.220 U.S. influence in the movement of law is thus 
far from simple. The spread of U.S. administrative law procedures, 
though substantial, does not ensure a full-scale promotion of U.S. 
interests through global governance mechanisms. Multiple processes of 
conflict and competition persist in the production and promotion of 
law.221  
IV.  CONCLUSION: A SOCIAL OPTIC FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE MOVEMENT 
OF CRIMINAL & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
The spread of U.S. legal procedures into domestic and international 
realms is subject to the choices that are embedded in processes of the 
transplanting and translating of law. Even though the United States is 
in a superior position to promote its legal procedures, criminal 
procedure and administrative law do not transplant automatically. They 
remain subject to processes of translating so as to satisfy local legal 
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language and specific institutional circumstances, as in the case of the 
movement of legal procedures to international organizations. This 
article concludes with a brief inquiry into the domestic and 
international counterparts of the legal domains examined above—the 
influence of U.S. criminal procedures on international law and the 
spread of U.S. administrative law into domestic administrative law 
systems. Although this article’s treatment of these alternate legal 
domains remains incomplete, it has aimed to highlight the multiple 
processes of interaction that impact efforts to transplant public law.  
Substantive international criminal law has developed at a 
tremendous pace with the creation of the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), following the establishment of ad hoc tribunals to address the 
atrocities in Bosnia, at the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and Rwanda, at the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).222 International criminal procedure, 
however, has developed far more slowly and with far less consensus. 
While many states quickly arrived at shared understandings of legal 
standards for genocide and crimes against humanity, the process of 
developing the procedures by which the international community 
enforces those standards proved more difficult when legal actors from 
different legal traditions came together to enforce them.223 The 
international human rights regime that has developed, however 
haltingly, does not specify whether the legal procedures by which 
defendants are to be tried should resemble an adversarial, inquisitorial, 
or some new or hybrid process.224 Instead, to garner the support of the 
greatest number of member states, the various human rights treaties 
make no guarantees for the right to a trial by jury, nor do they establish 
firm guidelines concerning the admissibility of evidence or the role of 
the adjudicator.225  
The struggle of the international community to find a consensus on 
matters of procedure is due in large part to the variety of domestic legal 
traditions of its constituent members. This is not the first time domestic 
legal traditions have shaped the implementation of international 
criminal law. At Nuremberg, where the United States and Britain 
supplied much of the legal procedure applied in the military tribunals, 
the procedures by which defendants were tried were largely adversarial 
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in origin, except where the adoption of inquisitorial devices rooted in 
civil law could be used to favor the prosecution.226 The development of 
rules of criminal procedure at the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC 
similarly reveals the influence of domestic legal traditions in the meting 
out of international justice, as well as the inevitable problems that arise 
when domestic procedural rules get lost in translation when applied in 
new settings.  
The ICTY statute was the first international criminal tribunal since 
the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials.227 The powerful influence and 
resources of U.S. actors, such as the American Bar Association, during 
the early operation of the tribunal, as well as the general ascendance of 
“adversarial legalism” in legal globalization described above, ensured 
the adoption of various adversarial methods.228 As multiple observers 
have noted, the procedural rules drew heavily from the Anglo-American 
tradition, with civil law concepts incorporated into a “predominantly 
common law framework.”229 Trials at both tribunals, though they differ 
in important ways, became largely party-driven, adversarial disputes 
between the prosecution and defendant.230 Because the different legal 
systems pursue different goals—e.g., truth vs. dispute resolution—the 
confusion caused by the juxtaposition of different legal procedures 
frustrated many participants in and observers of the international 
criminal tribunals. One procedural device that triggered considerable 
confusion when brought into use at an ad hoc tribunal was the 
allowance of guilty pleas and sentence bargaining.231 For example, even 
though judges expressly denied the inclusion of plea bargaining, 
prosecutors and defense attorneys nonetheless presented plea 
agreements to the trial chamber, which did not reject the practice.232 In 
one instance, a civil law attorney of one defendant at the ICTY 
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interpreted the guilty plea differently from how it is applied in common 
law systems. As a result, a court of appeals vacated the defendant’s 
conviction and sentence, ruling that he had pleaded guilty without 
informed consent.233  
The influence of the United States during the drafting of the rules 
for the ad hoc tribunals and the confusion it created in their translation 
to the post-conflict setting meant that states negotiating the Rules of 
Procedure and Evidence for the ICC were unable to reach an agreement 
over what legal tradition should guide international criminal justice.234 
Initial drafts of the ICC provided for an adversarial procedure, due 
again to the significant influence during the drafting process of U.S. 
lawyers. This adversarial approach, however, did not survive 
multilateral negotiations that sought to make new rules that were more 
“international” than they had been at the ad hoc tribunals, as well as to 
avoid some of the delays inherent to adversarial adjudication.235 The 
final product agreed to by the states,236 though argued by some to be a 
mixed system,237 largely avoids the challenge of choosing any particular 
legal tradition; instead it grants individual adjudicators a considerable 
amount of discretion to conduct trials according to their preferences and 
thus avoids the tricky issue of favoring inquisitorial or adversarial 
devices.238 As Bert Swart observes, “During the negotiations on the 
[ICC] Statute, diametrically opposed views between delegations from 
common law and civil law jurisdictions on the nature of the trial and the 
duties of parties and judges . . . made it impossible to reach agreement 
on crucial procedural issues.”239 In the end, terms of art associated with 
one legal tradition or the other were left out of the final drafts of the 
ICC Statute and the ICC rules of procedure and evidence.240 
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While U.S. influence on international criminal procedure has been 
substantial, if uneven, the spread of U.S. administrative law 
domestically has been relatively limited. In the case of domestic 
administrative law, the importance of legal origin or legal families 
persists.241 Civil law countries that inherited, for example, the French 
tradition of administrative law, have maintained its division between 
administrative and civil courts.242 Countries seeking acceptance into the 
European Union transplant EU-based rather than U.S. models of 
administrative law. Reforms, including measures for public 
participation or access to government information, are guided by EU 
administrative law experts or voluntary implementation of EU 
directives.243 As former consultants to the Latvian government have 
noted, in law reform projects, administrative law does not attract the 
same kind of attention—conceptually or in terms of funding—as other 
areas of law.244 Projects that deal with reforming commercial regulation 
aim for substantive reforms rather than procedural requirements.245 
Regulation and reform can also be pursued on a sectorial or 
agency-by-agency basis, obviating the need for transplanting full 
administrative law systems.246 Moreover, aspects of administrative law 
that mediate between the citizen and government can be addressed 
through functional equivalents,247 allowing oversight of governmental or 
quasigovernmental activity and goals for government accountability to 
occur through other branches of law.248 
In the decade prior to the sweeping reforms that replaced socialism 
in Eastern Europe, high court judges and other proponents of law 
reform transplanted elements of judicial review of administrative 
decisions.249 Since then, there has been scant evidence of U.S. 
administrative law transplants, even in former Soviet-Bloc countries 
that have been receptive to other U.S. public law procedures such as 
trial by jury. Reforms of the Soviet Arbitrazh, which formerly addressed 
disputes between state-owned enterprises, altered the part-judicial, 
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part-administrative institution into a system of commercial rather than 
administrative courts.250 Similar in structure to Continental Europe’s 
parallel specialized courts,251 the Arbitrazh courts deal with business 
complaints against administrative decisions as well as commercial 
disputes and other traditionally private law matters. In 2001, Latvia 
enacted administrative law procedures modeled after the German 
Administrative Procedure Act of 1976. Following the German 
administrative law tradition, the Latvian act focuses less on procedural 
matters and more on the appropriateness or proportionality of 
substantive outcomes.252 The Latvian act also provides guidelines for 
agency decisions rather than imposing a uniform procedure, allowing 
each agency to adopt procedures accordingly.253 In addition, countries 
have transplanted institutional checks on authority that differ in other 
ways from U.S.-style judicial review. Originally a Scandinavian 
innovation, the institution of Ombudsman has been transplanted into 
both pre-capitalist Poland in 1988 and post-socialist Czech Republic ten 
years later.254 
That U.S.-style administrative legal procedures do not appear in 
other domestic systems may have more to do with constraints on 
transplanting and translating laws which reflect the nature or type of 
state power, rather than an outright inability to spread procedural 
rights or due process principles.255 As far as administrative law 
coordinates the organization and exercise of state power, it embodies 
features of an activist state devoted to the fulfillment of state programs 
and the implementation of state policies.256 Administrative law thus 
invokes European legal systems which “attribute a distinctive mission” 
to public law.257 The United States is an unlikely donor for this area of 
law.  
The interactional nature of legal development may also mean that 
processes of transplanting and translating have to contend with extant 
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paradigms of legal thought. Legal culture influences processes of 
translating as well as donor decisions on how to frame or package legal 
transplants. Domestic administrative law is closely tied to a period of 
socially-oriented legal thought (between 1900 and 1968)258 that has 
since been superseded, more or less, by a period of rights and 
constitutional engagement.259 For Duncan Kennedy, “[h]uman rights are 
the ‘hypostatization’ of this trend, operating as universals . . .,” 
functioning “sometimes as rules (even absolute rules) and sometimes as 
mere policies.”260 Whereas constraint on administrative authority in the 
past found expression in socially-oriented concepts such as protection of 
the public interest, presently constraining authoritative action takes 
place through the language of rights (for example protecting IP 
rights).261 The human rights regime continues to emphasize an 
independent and impartial judiciary.262 Thus the hero figure in this 
legal world is still the judge. Aspects of judging increasingly come to be 
seen as transcending national boundaries263 in a legal world that 
promotes human rights and constitutional law as the legal core for 
domestic and supranational legal systems.264  
All of the examples of transplanting and translating legal 
procedures highlight conflict and contestation in the movement of law. 
When institutional and conceptual possibilities are “at stake,” legal 
actors choose between a set of possible institutional models.265 Some 
legal systems have privileged access to promote the legitimacy of their 
institutional models. But in some circumstances, for example at the ICC 
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or under the new Latvian administrative act, institutional “ad hocery” 
exacerbates or promotes competition by creating the institutional 
circumstances for continued and frequent marketing of legal procedures. 
Legal syncretism increasingly plays on processes of transplanting and 
translating legal procedures. Japan stands as a particular example in 
this regard. Following WWII, Japan may have had a transplant bias to 
the reception of U.S. law. But more recent and significant changes to 
Japan’s legal system under the Legal System Reform Council, including 
the creation of the Saiban-in Seido, evidence the new normal for 
transplanting and translating law: broad consultation of a range of 
international models as candidates for legal transplants and facility for 
translating multiple or even conflicting procedures into instantiations 
that are uniquely domestic.266  
Existing research will be enriched further and improved upon by 
investigations into domestic reception and the dynamics incorporating 
foreign legal norms. For now, this article suggests that the syncretism 
present in current legal thinking and practice267 gives considerable 
importance to movements of law and institution building, which 
challenges earlier notions of legalization, legal origin, and power-based 
views of the impositions of law—pointing instead to a polymorphic legal 
world with a plurality of options. 
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